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INTRODUCTION
Malick W. Ghachem*
This symposium offers a rare opportunity to see three of the finest minds in
Law and Religion scholarship from both sides of the North Atlantic at work. Held
at the University of Maine on March 23, 2012, the symposium featured a keynote
address by Professor Joseph Weiler of New York University Law School.1
Professor Weiler’s remarks were occasioned by a 2011 decision of the European
Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) in Strasbourg, Lautsi v. Italy, upholding the
constitutionality of the display of the crucifix in Italian public school classrooms
under the European Convention of Human Rights (“the Convention”).2 The
principal respondents were Pierre-Henri Prélot of the University of Cergy-Pontoise
in France and William Marshall of the University of North Carolina School of Law.
The dialogue between these three great students of European and American
constitutional law taps into some of the most urgent and controversial issues on the
church/state horizon.
In his 2005 book A Christian Europe? (published in French and Italian
editions, among others, but not yet in English), Weiler argued that Europe should
be able to freely embrace its Christian heritage.3 As Prélot reminds us, this
argument was first made in connection with the 2004-2005 debates over whether to
include a clause acknowledging the relationship between Europe and Christian
values in the preamble of the proposed constitutional treaty of the European Union.
That treaty was rejected by French (and later also by Dutch) voters in a May 2005
referendum and so never came into effect. Although keyed to that debate, Weiler’s
book also developed a more general set of arguments about the implications for
European identity of acknowledging or denying Europe’s Christian traditions.
Around this same time period, the Lautsi case began winding its way up
through the Italian court system and, eventually, towards the ECHR. The display
of the crucifix in Italian public schools dates back to a pair of royal decrees from
the 1920s, and even further back to an 1859 law of the Kingdom of PiedmontSardinia requiring such display. (Piedmont-Sardinia was soon to be united into the
new Kingdom of Italy during the Risorgimento of the 1860s that created the
modern Italian nation.) After the Italian Council of State sustained the
constitutionality of this practice as a matter of Italian constitutional law in 2006,
Lautsi, the parent of an Italian public school pupil, brought a challenge before the
ECHR. The ECHR Second Chamber – which we can roughly analogize to a three* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law.
1. The lead organizer of the symposium was Francesca Vassallo of the University of Southern
Maine’s History and Political Science Department. Martin Rogoff of the University of Maine School of
Law and myself were co-organizers. Maine Law’s Franco-American Law Seminar, founded and
directed by Professor Rogoff, made possible the participation of colleagues and students from the law
schools in Le Mans and Rennes, France. The conference benefitted from the support of the Florence
Gould Foundation, among other sponsors.
2. Lautsi v. Italy, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2011).
3. For the French edition, see JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, L’EUROPE CHRÉTIENNE? UNE EXCURSION
(2007).
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member federal appellate panel in the American system – found the display of the
crucifix to be in violation of the Convention. That ruling was then appealed to the
full court of the ECHR, which reversed the Second Chamber. Weiler argued the
case before the en banc court on behalf of a number of third-party EU-member
states (Italy was represented by separate counsel).4
Weiler’s basic impulse is to raise questions about two understandings of the
law of church and state: American neutrality and French laïcité, those distinctive
products of the American and French revolutions, respectively. He writes that the
idea of “neutrality,” a longtime (if increasingly on-the defensive) backbone of
American religious liberty law,5 is often anything but, for it tends to privilege
secular over religious positions whenever the issue of religion’s place in the public
square arises. The French tradition of laïcité, in his view, has much the same
effect, though Marshall’s point that American church-state law often struggles to
reconcile neutrality with competing free exercise and other values suggests a less
cozy relationship between these two traditions.
But if not neutrality or laïcité, then what? Mistakenly held out as a right-wing
spokesperson for a theocratic state in some quarters, Weiler embraces the old ideal
of toleration. Toleration, he suggests, has come upon hard times at the hands of
those purporting to act in its name: the inheritors of the Lockean, Madisonian, and
Jeffersonian commitment to freedom of conscience. Not for Weiler, the late
eighteenth-century skepticism of George Washington that toleration as an ideal is
sufficiently robust to protect liberty of conscience. In a 1790 letter to the Hebrew
Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island, Washington famously dismissed the
concept of toleration for presuming that it was only “by the indulgence of one class
of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights.”6 The
First Amendment religion clauses, in other words, embodied a regime of right
rather than toleration: their operation did not depend on whether despised
minorities of the day happened to find favor with those (temporarily) in power.
Weiler’s most profound contribution to this debate is to encourage us to think
about liberty of conscience not as a narrow function of the rights-bearing individual
but rather in the broader political sense of compromise between those of religious
and non-religious sensibilities. The Lautsi case matters because it permits a
reasonable constitutional reconciliation between the laïque and non-laïque states of
Europe and so gives to the rest of the world an example of how liberal democracy
and religious sensibilities can coexist. He implies that this compromise will also
protect and even advance the interests of European citizens who do not share the
“official religions” of their states: states, that is, with modern establishment
traditions such as Italy, Britain, and Denmark.
On that last point much depends. What kind of a claim is Weiler making here?
Is it a normative thesis about the proper relationship between a national state and its
citizens at the substantive level of religious liberty law? When Weiler speaks of
4. Professor Weiler’s oral argument can be seen and heard online at
http://dotsub.com/view/65bc5332-aa10-4b8c-bc50-d051e8f4fcc7 (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
5. For a recent defense of the neutrality tradition, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013).
6. George Washington’s Reply to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode Island (Aug. 18,
1790), http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents/hebrew/reply.html.
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religious liberty as a communitarian rather than individual right, he engages us at
this level of analysis. In other respects, however, he seems to have in mind a
primarily structural thesis about how best to preserve state-to-state “toleration” in a
non-federal union such as Europe’s (one that for financial reasons has seemed
conspicuously fragile in recent times). Prélot’s critique turns on this distinction.
Like Marshall, he questions whether it is true that the French and American models
of democracy entail consigning religion to the private sphere in the same way. In
his oral argument before the ECHR, Weiler pointedly warned the judges of the
harms that would flow from Europe’s drift towards an American non-establishment
pole. Prélot’s analysis suggests that the harms at issue here are those of Americanstyle unitary constitutional law (one rule for all fifty states), not those of
substantive American religious liberty law. He concludes, regretfully, that Lautsi
represents the end of a certain modern European tradition of separating religion
from politics: Christianity is now a de facto part of substantive European
constitutional law.7
Marshall shares Prélot’s anxiety that Weiler has won the war over religion
after losing the 2004 battle over the (failed) EU Treaty. He is sympathetic to
Weiler’s critique of neutrality as a misleading abstraction, but finally speaks from
the eighteenth-century voice of Madison and Jefferson: non-establishment prevents
the corruption of religion by governmental oversight and the division of society
into warring religious factions, each competing with the others for public
recognition. Marshall associates the first of these dynamics with a revolutionaryera, evangelical understanding of separation that is only partly captured in Weiler’s
concept of “freedom from religion.” The paradox of this evangelical version of
separation is that it conceives of the secular state as an instrument for the protection
and promotion of faith. Locke walks hand in hand with a robust church; in this
way the American experiment still lives as a model for getting beyond the Old
World’s history of religious strife.
But do free exercise and non-establishment introduce their own kind of
competitiveness between religions? A recent study shows that Muslim Americans
are significantly less likely to prevail on free exercise claims in federal court than
followers of other religions.8 Do we have a culture of “comparative free exercise
success” in the making? Do secularism and non-establishment really remove the
jousting between religions for the approval of the state, where that approval is
framed as a matter of judicial acceptance of religious liberty claims rather than
7. On the distinction between American-style separation of church and state and the European
separation of religion and politics, see James Q. Whitman, Separating Church and State: The Atlantic
Divide, in LAW, SOCIETY, AND HISTORY: THEMES IN THE LEGAL SOCIOLOGY AND LEGAL HISTORY OF
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN 233, 233-37 (Robert Gordon & Morton Horwitz eds., 2011).
8. See Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11:
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231 (2012) (finding that Muslim
Americans are slightly more than half as successful as other religious liberty claimants in the federal
courts, and concluding that this discrepancy is most likely due to judicial internalization of popular
associations of Muslims with terrorism). The evidence that Sisk and Heise adduce is significant, but the
methods they bring to bear on that evidence are unsatisfactory. Statistical analysis and inferences based
on social and cognitive psychology, by themselves, cannot substitute for an analysis of what judges
actually say. See Malick W. Ghachem, Religious Liberty and the Financial War on Terror, 12 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2013).
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theocratic endorsement of particular faiths? Europe’s continuing difficulties in
integrating Muslim communities makes the American experience in this respect
seem like a success story, but Weiler’s intervention suggests that there may be
hidden, or at least less visible, costs to that success.
The rich and lively symposium that follows encourages us to think hard about
this and other questions. I want to conclude by thanking the editors of the Maine
Law Review for their work on this dialogue, and Professors Weiler, Prélot, and
Marshall for revealing to us so powerfully the lingering presence of the Atlantic
revolutionary past in the law of religious liberty.

